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COMPETENCY FOR TRIAL IN
NORTH DAKOTA
HON. RALPH B. MAXWELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
When common law principles were taking root in England, if a
person accused of crime should be stricken by mental disease, it
was viewed as an interdictory act of Almighty God. With the hand
of God so visibly at work upon the case, all criminal proceedings
were thereupon halted.' The common law rule which evolved for-
bade arraignment, trial or sentence of one whose mental faculties
had suffered discernable impairment.2
Aside from supernatural consideration, there were also rational
and practical grounds for suspending criminal proceedings against
an insane accused. These reasons were aptly stated by Blackstone
in his famed Commentaries:
[I]f a man in his sound memory commits a capital of-
fense, and before arraignment for it he becomes mad, he
ought not to be arraigned for it, because he is not able to
plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And
if, after he has pleaded the prisoner becomes mad, he shall
not be tried, for how can he make his defense? If, after he
be tried and found guilty, he loses his senses before judg-
ment, judgment shall not be pronounced, and if after judg-
ment he becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be
stayed, for, peradventure, says the humanity of the English
law, had the prisoner been of sound memory he might have
alleged something in stay of judgment or execution.,
These common law precepts have now been widely incorporated
into the statutes of the member states of the Union, as well as those
of the federal government. 4
* B.S.C. University of North Dakota, 1941; L.L.B. University of North Dakota, 1947;
District Judge, First Judicial District, Fargo, North Dakota.
1. People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555, 107 N.E.2d 861 (1952).
2. In re Buchanan, 129 Cal. 330, 61 P. 1120 (1900).
8. Id. citing 4 BL. COMM. 24.
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244 et. seq. (1970).
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The issue of insanity can be introduced into a criminal case in
two distinct ways. Most familiarly, it is interposed as a defense to
a criminal charge through a claim that the defendant was insane
when the crime was committed. Resolving that issue calls for stand-
ards dissimilar to those relating to competency to stand trial.
Before insanity can succeed as an affirmative defense it must
meet the "right and wrong" test found in the classic M'Naghten
case: was the defendant, at the time of the crime "laboring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it,
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong? "
The matter of present insanity is notably different. It does not
constitute a defense to crime. It has nothing to do with criminal
responsibility. Rather, the issue is whether an accused is mentally
incapacitated to the degree that he cannot comprehend the nature
and peril of the proceedings against him or cooperate with his
counseI to properly defend against the charge. The leading American
case on the point, Dusky v. United States,8 describes the test of
present insanity to be:
[W]hether he has sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational under-
standing - -and Whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.' 7
II. NORTH DAKOTA STATUTORY PROVISIONS
In North Dakota prior to 1933, whenever doubt arose regarding
a defendant's present sanity, a separate jury was impaneled to re-
solve the issue." If the jury found the defendant sane, the prose-
cution was immediately resumed. If the defendant was found to be
insane, proceedings were suspended until restoration of his faculties.
The 1933 Legislative Assembly enacted new procedures.9 These
were based upon the model statute prepared and approved by the
American Law Institute.' As amended slightly in 1967,1" this law
now comprises Sections 29-20-01 and 29-20-02 of the North Dakota
Century Code.1
2
5. M'Naghter's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng. Reprint 718 (Eng. 1843).
6. Duskey v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
7. Id.
8. 1913 CoMPILED LAws o N.D. § 11064 (repealed 1933).
9. Ch. 216, [1933] N.D. Laws 334.
10. According to a Revisor's Note, Code Revision Report, North Dakota Revised Code
of 1943, the 1933 act was a verbatim text of the model act.
11. Ch. 214, [1967] N.D. Laws 429.
12. These sections read as follows:
If, before or during the trial, the court has reasonable grounds to believe
that the defendant against whom an indictment has been found or an infor-
mation filed is insane or mentally defective to the extent that he is unable
800
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In its present form, the law eliminates the jury and requires
the court to determine a defendant's mental state. The judge must
hold a hearing whenever he has "reasonable grounds" to believe
that insanity or mental deficiency disables the defendant "to the
extent that he is unable to understand the proceedings against him
or to assist in his defense." 1 Prior to the hearing, the court may
select "two disinterested qualified experts" to examine the ac-
cused. 14 This examination Is to equip the experts to give evidence
at the competency hearing," to which they would come as non-
adversary officers of the court. 16 Presumably the order appointing
the experts would instruct them explicitly as to their objectives, i.e.,
to ascertain the defendant's capacity to understand the criminal
proceedings and to assist in his defense. Otherwise, their reports
and testimony are apt to be based on inappropriate standards or be
so burdened with irrelevancies and confused by contradictions as to
be of little service to the court."
The statute permits an alternate procedure. The court may com-
mit, the accused to either the state hospital for the mentally ill,
to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense, the
court Immediately shall fix a time for a hearing to determine the defend-
ant's mental condition. The court may appoint two disinterested qualified
experts to examine the defendant with regard to his present mental con-
dition and to testify at the hearing, or it may commit the defendant to
the state hospital at Jamestown or the state school at Grafton for ob-
servation and examination regarding his present mental condition. The
proper officer of such Institution shall present to the court which conducted
the hearing a report regarding the defendant's present mental condition.
He also may be summoned to testify at the hearing. Other evidence re-
garding the defendant's mental condition may be introduced at the hearing
by either party. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-20-01 ( (1971 Supp).
If the court, after the hearing, decides that the defendant' Is able to
understand the proceedings and to assist in his defense, it shall proceed
with the trial, but if it decides that the defendant, because of insanity or
mental deficiency, is not able to understand the proceedings or to assist
in his defense, it shall take proper steps to have the defendant committed
to the state hospital at Jamestown or the stnte school at Grafton, which-
ever Institution seems most appropriate. If thereafter the proper officer of
such Institution is of the opinion that the defendant is able to under-
stand the proceedings and to assist in his defense, he shall report this fact
to the court which committed the defendant. If the officer so reports, the
court shall fix a time for a hearing to determine whether the defendant is
able to understand the proceedings and to assist in his defense. This hear-
ing shall be conduoted in all respects like the original hearing to determine
the defendant's mental condition. If, after this hearing, the court decides
that the defendant is able to understand the proceedings against him and
to a ssist in his defense, it shall proceed with the trial. If, however, it de-
cides that the defendant still is not able to upnderstand the proceedings
against him or to assist in his defense, it shall recommit him to the state
hospital at Jamestown or state school at Grafton, whichever the case may
be. N D. CENT. CODE § 29-20-02 (1971 Supp).
13. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-20-01 (1971 Supp.).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. In re Harmon, 425 F.2d 916, 918 (2d Cir. 1970).
17. Experience has taught that medical experts frequently misinterpret their assign-
ment and misunderstand the governing legal standards. Their training prompts them to
rely on medical criteria for mental illness which axe largely irrelevant to the legal criteria
for determining competency to stand trial. See Rosenberg, Competency for Tran--Who
Knows Best? 6 CRIM. L. BULL. 577 (1970).
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or to the state school for mental defectives for "observation and ex-
amination."'1 8 In practice, this is the course quite routinely select-
ed-despite the apparent preferability in many cases of using disin-
terested experts. The probable reason why the commitment route
is usually taken is the failure of the statute to intimate how or by
whom the independent experts will be paid.
Under the statute, when a defendant suspected of mental de-
rangement is committed for examination, the "proper officer"'19 of
the institution is required to furnish the court with a report.2 0 The
statute says the officer making the report "may" be summoned to
testify at the competency hearing. Although apparently not man-
datory, it would seem only prudent to always have him present.
This would avoid the many evidentiary problems that would inevi-
tably arise if he were not present for cross-examination by counsel.
Once "reasonable grounds" are found to exist for doubting the
competency of an accused, a hearing must be held." The statute
appears to contemplate a hearing even though the conclusions con-
tained in preliminary reports indicate the defendant is competent.22
Section 29-20-02 details what is to happen in the aftermath of
the hearing. It provides that if the defendant is found to suffer no
present impairment, he must be tried in due course. However, if
he is deemed unable to understand the proceedings or assist in his
defense, the court is required to have him committed. 23 He then
remains institutionalized at either the state hospital or the Grafton
State School until he is reported fit to stand trial. Upon receiving
such a report, the court is required to hold a new competency hear-
ing. The defendant is then either tried, or recommitted, depending
upon the showing made at the new hearing.2'
III. RAISING THE ISSUE OF INCOMPETENCY
An inquest into mental capacity to stand trial can be started in
several ways. The law requires only that "reasonable grounds" be
shown before the court is authorized to order a hearing.25 Usually
18. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-20-01 (1971 Supp).
19. Id. The statute neglects to tell us who this "proper officer" is. Presumably he is
the superintendent of the institution.
20. Id. The law does not make clear the role this report is to play in the proceedings.
Is it merely for the Information of the court? Is it to be furnished to counsel for In-
spection prior to the hearing to avoid surprise? Is it to become a part of the record at
the hearing? Can it be entered into evidence over objection that it is hearsay-which
it obviously Is? These questions remain unanswered In this jurisdiction.
21. Id.
22. There Is respectable authority holding that a preliminary report showing compe-
tency may obviate the need for a hearing. Markham v. United States, 184 F.2d 512 (4th
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 936 (1951); Cheely v. United States, 367 F.2d 547
(5th Cir. 1966).
23. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-20-02 (1971 Supp.).
24. Id.
25. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-20-01 (1971).
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the question is initiated by the written motion of defense counsel,
supported by affidavit. 26 The affidavit should contain substantial in-
telligence from a reputable source.27
The prosecution, too, has a duty to request a sanity hearing if
its information suggests incompetency. 2 And certainly the court's
own observation and knowledge can require it to initiate such a
hearing upon its own motion.2 9
The sanity question can, according to the statute, be brought up
at any time "before or during the trial."' 30 It should, of course, be
raised before the conclusion of the trial.31 A court ought to guard
against imposture, and should look carefully at a request which by
undue tardiness suggests it is tactical rather than factual.
Insanity can also be raised as a reason for not pronouncing judg-
ment.82 That, however, is outside the intendment of the present ar-
ticle.
IV. SCOPE OF THE COMPETENCY STATUTE
When the present law was first enacted in 1933, its provisions
were to control only proceedings in the district courts and county
courts of increased jurisdiction. Section 1 of the act read:
The provisions of this act shall apply in all criminal cases
tried in District Courts or County Courts with increased jur-
isdiction.
This provision, however, was not included in the 1943 revision
of the Code. Neither was it incorporated into the present Century
Code. This omission signifies its repeal.-
It appears that elimination of Section 1 limits the statute to
district court proceedings. As it now reads, the statute specifies that
26. The federal practice under 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970) does not require an affidavit.
An embellished motibn for psychiatric examination -must be granted unless it Is frivolous.
United States v. Burgin, 440 F.2d 1092 (4th Cir. 1971); Lebron v. United States, 229
F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; Wear v. United States, 218 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
27. Hinex v. State, 417 P.2d 339 (Okla. 1966) ; State v. Bessar, 213 La. 299, 34 So. 2d
785 (1941).
28. State v. Smith, 173 Kan. 813, 252 P.2d 922 (1953); Magenton v. State, 76 S.D.
512, 81 N.W.2d 894 (1957).
29. State v. Childs, 198 Kan. 4, 422 P.2d 898 (1967) ; Bingham v. State, 165 P.2d 646
(Okla. 1946); Morales v. State, 427 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. 1968); A court must halt a trial
where ground for doubt as to defendant's mental capacity arises. Bizarre or singularly
detached and withdrawn behavior during trial may signal the presence of mental dis-
order of which the court should takek cognizance. People v. Aparlcio, 38 Cal. 565, 241
P.2d 221 (1952). Or, as in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), the testimony of lay
witness during trial may obligate the court to hold a competency hearing, even though
defendant's demeanor at the trial is that of a lucid man.
30. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-20-01 (1971 Supp.).
31. Chapman v. State, 136 Tex. Cr. 285, 124 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1938).
32. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-26-12 (1960).
33. Ch. 216, § 1, [1933] N.D. Laws 334.
34. Omission from the code acts as a repeal. Satrom v. City of Grand Forks, 150
N.W.2d 700, 704 (N.D. 1967) ; Higgins v. Hawks, 122 N.W.2d 129, 132 (N.D. 1963).
803
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
it applies to defendants "against whom an indictment has been
found or an information filed."35 Prosecution is by criminal com-
plaint in lower courts, rather than by indictment or information."
However, in State v. Iverson'3 7 discussed hereinafter, the North Da-
kota Supreme Court ruled that the statute applies even to commit-
ting magistrate proceedings. This ruling carries with it the inference
that the reach of the present competency law is now broad enough
to include criminal actions in all state courts, whatever their stature
or venue. The naked language of the law does not support such
broad application; but this interpretation will be felicitous in one
respect at least. The judicial extension of the present competency
statute to all courts assures a measure of uniformity and consis-
tency that would otherwise be wanting. Even without a statute, an
insane person is entitled to exemption from prosecution in all courts,
including justice court and police magistrate's court.3 8 With no
statute for guidance, the procedure would be governed by the com-
mon law, which leaves the mode of inquiry to the discretion of the
court.3 9
V. PROOF OF DISABILITY
The original North Dakota law relating to competency in crimi-
nal cases detailed carefully the hearing procedure.40 The present
law is silent on the subject. Generally it has been held that the
accused is required to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that he is mentally incapacitated. 41 Because of the universal legal
presumption that a person is compos mentis, there must be suffi-
cient proof to overcome that presumption.
Fundamentally, the mental disability must influence his capacity
to defend. Only if his reason is impaired in that particular area
can an accused avoid present trial, regardless of how defective his
reason or judgment may otherwise be.42 He may be mentally ill
q5. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-20-01 (1971 Supp.).
26. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-09-01 (1960) states "[aJIl crimes or public offenses triable
in the district courts must be prosecuted by information or indictment .... " It might be
argued though, that N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08-24 (1960) would still make the competency
statute apply to the county courts of Increased jurisdiction. That section makes dis-
trict court rules of procedure generally applicable to such county courts.
37. State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1971).
38. "In cases of minor crimes, triable by the magistrate himself, the question of the
defendant's mental capacity to make a rational defense, must, of course, be decided by
the magistrate...." H. WEIHOFTEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 436
(1954).
29. "At common law it was for the court to determine whether a defendant was men-
tally fit to be put on trial or sentenced and the nature of the investigation to be made
on the issue of sanity was vested in the sound discretion of the court." State v. Ander-
son, 186 Neb. 435, 183 N.W.2d 766, 768 (1971).
40. 1913 COMPILED LAWS OF ND. §§ 11065, 11066 (repealed 1933).
41. H. WEIHOFTEN, supra note 38, at 434-35.
42. In re Buchanan, 129 Cal. 330, 61 P. 1120 (1900) ; Freeman v. People 4 Denio 9,
47 Am. Dec. 216 (N.Y. 1847).
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and in need of treatment or hospitalization, but still be fit to stand
trial. Monomaniacs, paranoiacs, schizophrenics, hallucinators all
suffer from mental illness, but may nonetheless be able to com-
prehend fully the proceedings against them and give rational assis-
tance to counsel.43 In such cases there is no reason for intermission
in the course of the prosecution. The trial should proceed.
The accused is entitled to 'have the aid of counsel and to be
present at the sanity hearing. 44 The court is usually accorded wide
latitude of discretion on the question of competency, and its finding
is ordinarily regarded as res judicata. 45
VI. STATE V. IVERSON
A. NARRATIVE
The only reported decision where the state courts have been
confronted with the North Dakota law on present insanity is State
v. Iv erson,46 decided in 1971. In that case the defendant Iverson was
convicted on two charges of murder. Upon appeal, one of his nu-
merous specifications of error charged that he was .mentally incom-
petent at the time of the preliminary examination.4 7 His incompe-
tence, he asserted, rendered him incapable of giving assistance to
his court appointed counsel. Hence, he reasoned, he was unconsti-
tutionally deprived of the effectual aid of counsel at a critical stage
of the criminal proceedings.4 8
Iverson had a history of mental illness. Therefore, prior to the
preliminary hearing, the state moved the magistrate to commit him
to the state hospital for a report on his ability to assist his de-
fense. The magistrate declined. Instead, he ordered that examina-
tions be made by two employees of the state Regional Mental
Health Center - one a psychiatrist, the other a psychologist. One
of these experts expressed the opinion that the accused could
neither understand the criminal proceedings nor assist in his de-
43. U.S. v. Gundelfinger, 98 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
44. Martin v. Settle, 192 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Mo. 1961).
45. Krupnick v. United States, 264 F.2d 213 (8th Cir. 1959).
46. State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1 (N D. 1971).
47. The purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine if there is a basis to
hold an accused person for trial.
If it appears from a preliminary examination that a public offense
has been committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe the de-
fendant guilty thereof, the magistrate should hold him to answer. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 29-07-20 (1960).
48. State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1, 35 (N.D. 1971). In Coleman v. Alabama, 399
U.S. 1 (1970), (decided after the Iverson trial) the United States Supreme Court ruled
that the preliminary hearing is a critical stage of a criminal case at which an accused
is constitutionally entitled to aid of counsel. The North Dakota Supreme Court in Iverson
noted that, at the time of their decision, the retroactive effect of Coleman had not yet
been determined. State v. Iverson, supra at 35. However, that question proved to be
essentially irrelevant because the court ruled that the magistrate's error in going for-
ward with the preliminary hearing was harmless. State v. Iverson, supra at 35.
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fense. The other diagnosed the case as "Schizophrenic Reaction,
Paranoid Type, Chronic."
After receiving the evaluations, the magistrate decided the issue
of incompetency should properly be reserved for the trial court.-"
He therefore held the preliminary examination, entered a finding
of probable cause, and bound the defendant over to the district
court. The North Dakota Supreme Court decided this was improper.
It ruled that provisions of Section 29-20-0150 governed committing
magistrate proceedings, and stated:
The magistrate erred, however, when he failed to im-
mediately fix a time for a hearing to determine Iverson's
mental condition, as required by Section 29-20-01 N.D.C.C.
This error was compounded when he proceeded to hold a
preliminary hearing while he had before him two reports
indicating that Iverson was not capable of understanding
the nature of the charges against him or assisting in his
own defense, thereby raising the inference that he was denied
the assistance of counsel under the standards of Dusky.51
The Supreme Court decided, however, that the magistrate's ac-
tion, even though erroneous, was not sufficiently grave to require
intervention. The whole record, including in particular a subsequent
report indicating that Iverson was competent to stand trial, render-
ed the error harmless, the court concluded.5 2 None of the other
grounds for appeal were found meritorious, and the trial court's
judgment was affirmed. This adverse outcome was appealed by
Iverson to the United States Supreme Court, but that court declined
to accept it for review.58
Iverson then took a new tack. He filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court, claiming he was
being unlawfully imprisoned. A principle ground asserted for his
release was again his claimed incompetency at his preliminary hear-
ing. The federal court agreed with the state court that the magis-
trate erred in proceeding with the preliminary hearing.5" It did not
agree that the error was harmless, however.5 5 It ruled that be-
49. According to the North Dakota Supreme Court opinion, the magistrate felt
that "a preliminary examination must be held to allow the defendant and his counsel to
examine the state's case, and to allow the public to hear the facts upon which the
state had commenced a case against the defendant." State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1, 34
(N.D. 1971).
50. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-20-01 (1971 Supp.).
51. State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1, 35 (N.D. 1971).
52. Id. at 35-36.
53. State v. Iverson, 404 U.S. 956 (1971).
54. Iverson v. State, 347 F. Supp. 251, 260 (D.N.D. 1972).
65. Id . The reasons given by the North Dakota Supreme Court for viewing the mag-
istrate's error as harmless were severely scored by the federal court. The North Dakota
court had held that experts reports did not constitute conclusive proof of incompetency,
and that the force of the reports was diminished by a later state hospital evaluation
which found Iverson legally competent. State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1, 36 (N.D. 1971).
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cause professional expert opinion had stated Iverson was legally
incompetent, his substantial rights had been violated by holding the
hearing. The professional opinions clearly established, the court de-
clared with colorful simile, that Iverson "could be of no more help
to his lawyer than a tailor's mannequin." 56 His condition, the court
said, "was known to the magistrate, and that by no stretch of the
imagination can the Supreme Court (of North Dakota) dismiss the
procedure followed as 'harmless error'. ' '5 7 It caustically dismissed
as "a judicial cop out"58 weight given by the state court to the
State hospital examination made following the preliminary hearing
that indicated Iverson was legally competent. The court pointed out
that "both reports could have been correct at the time they were
made."5 9
For this, as well as other reasons not germane to this discus-
sion, the federal court announced that it would free Iverson on a
writ of habeas corpus unless the state promptly retried him.6 0 The
state thereupon pursued an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit.6'
B. COMMENT
There are two features of the Iverson case that invite comment.
The first is this: neither the state nor federal court addressed any
discussion to whether the issue of competency to proceed is properly
raised before the committing magistrate. Each court appears to
suppose that the magistrate had full authority under the present
sanity statute to determine whether or not a hearing should be held;
to appoint experts to examine the defendant; to hold a sanity in-
quest; and to confine the defendant for the duration of the disabil-
ity if legal incompetence was learned to exist.
That such expansive powers belong to a committing magistrate
is open to the gravest doubt. As alluded to earlier, the legislature
originally limited the compass of the present sanity statute to in-
clude only district courts and courts of increased jurisdiction.6 2 The
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. Emphasis by the court. The contradictory reports were separated by an interim
of about three months. The first examination was about six weeks before preliminary
examination ; the other about eight weeks afterward.
60. Id. at 261. It is difficult to see 'how a re-trial will correct fault stemming from
abridgement of defendant's constitutional rights at his preliminary hearing. The state
trial court found him competent to stand trial. This finding Is not challenged. If the
error is at the preliminary hearing level, it would seem Its cure should hte there rather
than at the trial level.
61. As this issue was being prepared for publication, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit handed down its decision in Iverson V. State, No. 72-1600 (8th Cir., June
11, 1973). The author discusses the Court of Appeal's opinion in an addendum following
this article.
62. Ch. 216, § 1, [1933] N.D. Laws 334.
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abandonment of that specific limitation through subsequent codifi-
cation would not, it seems, expand the statute to cover other courts.
On the contrary, as measured by present language, its dominion
appears contracted. Now included within its embracement are only
defendants "against whom an indictment has been found or an in-
formation filed" and no others.65 And, of course, only in the dis-
trict court can be found defendants who are under indictment or
informed against.6 -
The weight of recorded judicial authority upon the question re-
jects the proposition that committing magistrates have any pre-
scription to resolve sanity questions.6 5 Directly in point is the re-
cent Arizona case, State v. Pima County Superior Court."
Arizona has a competency rule that is virtually identical to the
North Dakota statute. 7 In the Pima County case the question of
applicability of that rule to committing magistrate proceedings was
considered. The supreme court of that state declared:
The rule clearly indicates that it has no application to pre-
liminary hearings since the rule does not come into play
until an indictment has been found or an information filed.
Judicial inquiry into defendant's ability to present a defense
is vested only in the trial court which has the power to try
the felony offense charged.6
63. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-20-01 (1971 Supp.).
64. Moreover, N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-20-02 (1971 Supp.) confirms that only proceedings
In trial court were contemplated by directing that if the defendant Is found competent,
the court should "proceed with the trial."
65. Mance v. Cameron, 260 F. Supp. 851 (D.D.C. 1966) ; Flint v. Sater, 374 P.2d 929
(Okla. 1962); State v. McCredden, 33 Wisc. 661, 148 N.W.2d 33 (1967); Schwader V.
District Court, 172 Colo. 474, 474 P.2d 607 (1970) ; State v. Pima County Superior Court,
103 Ariz. 369, 442 P.2d 113 (1968). New York, however, by statute specifically confers au-
thority to hold a sanity hearing upon a magistrate. People v. Dumas, 51 Misc.2d 929,
274 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1966).
66. State v. Pima County Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 369, 442 P.2d 113 (1968).
67. ARIZONA. R. CRIa. P. 250 provides:
A. If before and during the trial the court has reasonable ground to believe
that the defendant, against whom an indictment has been found or informa-
tion filed, is insane or mentally defective, to the extent that he is unable to
understand the 'proceedings agairst him or to assist in his defense, the
court shall immediately set a time for a hearing to determine the defendant's
nental condition. The court may appoint two disinterested qualified experts
to examine the defendant with regard to his present mental condition and
to testify at the hearing. Other evidence regarding the defendant's mental
condition may be introduced at the hearing by either party.
B. If the court, after the hearing, decides that the defendant is able to
understand the proceedings and to assist in his defense it shall proceed
with the trial. If it decides that the defendant through insanity or men-
tal deficiency is not able to understand the Proceedings or to assist in his
defense, it shall have the defendant committed to the institution author-
ized to receive him, and the commitment of the defendant shall exonerate
his bail. If thereafter the authorized officer of such institution is of the
opinion that the defendant is able to understand the proceedings and to
assist in his defense, he shall report such fact to the court which con-
ducted the hearing. If the officer so reports, the court shall proceed with
the trial, and may again admit the defendant to bail, if he is bailable.
68. State v. Pima County Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 369, 442 P.2d 113, 116 (1968).
Thus the Arizona court's conclusion supports the action of the magistrate In the Iverson
case, who likewise felt that the trial court alone was vested with authority to inquire
into a defendant's sanity.
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The Arizona court went on to discuss the proper course when
the question of competency is raised in a preliminary hearing. The
magistrate must, the court said, proceed with the preliminary hear-
ing. If probable cause is found, the defendant should be bound over
to the trial court. There the issue of competency can be properly
heard and settled. In those cases where the defendant is committed,
the court said, he would be eligible for a new preliminary hearing
upon his restoration to competency.6 9
This appears to be sturdy reasoning. It is an interpretation that
harmonizes agreeably with the wording of the statute. In addition,
it demonstrably shows that no permanent harm will ensue by sus-
pending the question of competency until the case is in the hands
of the trial judge. A new preliminary hearing upon recovery from
the disability would cure any due process defect.
Furthermore, it may well be premature and unjust for a mag-
istrate to commit a person as an insane criminal prior to any ex-
posure whatsoever of circumstances connecting him with a crime.
If the state in its zeal has accused the wrong person, and he is
insane, he could be confined indefinitely with no determination
whether the case against him warrants his being held. If his im-
pairment is permanent, the basis for holding him can never be
aired. The state's case may be too fragile to withstand cautious
judicial scrutiny for probable cause at a preliminary examination.
Thus it can pose a greater threat to due process, and work more
of an injustice to order commitment prior to a preliminary exami-
nation than to hold the examination despite the accused's impaired
condition. Commitment prior to a preliminary hearing may serve
to deprive the accused entirely of the hearing. It would seem that
a hearing, held even though the accused may be legally incompe-
tent, is preferable to no hearing at all. And in any event, as the
Arizona court indicated, an insane accused would be entitled to
another preliminary hearing upon restoration of his faculties.
The second point of comment on the Iverson case concerns only
the Federal District Court opinion. It has to do with the imperative
weight given to the reports of experts. The court's language-per-
haps inadvertently-confers upon expert evaluations an aura of in-
violability. The court declares, without qualification, that the opin-
ion of experts indicating an inability to understand the criminal pro-
ceedings or assist in the defense, is conclusive of the issue. This
view, in effect, endorses unsworn, untested, out-of-court professional
opinions and raises them to the dignity of a judicial determination.
The court said:
69. Id. at 117.
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How may a defendant in a criminal case be of any assis-
tance to his counsel when qualified professional experts
have said he was incapable of understanding the nature of
the proceedings against him and not mentally competent to
assist in his own defense? 70
Thus the court has embraced as proven fact, without a competency
proceeding, that Iverson was mentally disabled in the statutory
sense at the time of his preliminary examination.
Further, the federal court said that it was manifest "on the face
of the record" that Iverson could not assist his lawyer.71 Yet, the
only "record" of incompetency before the court was the opinion of
experts. Using this source alone, the court pronounced Iverson to
be as helpless in aiding his attorney as "a tailor's mannequin. ' 72
Even conceding that failure of the committing magistrate to hold
a sanity hearing was error, it was not, as the federal court avers,
because the opinions of the experts established legal incompetency.
It would have been error because those opinions raised a sufficient
inference of incompetency to require a judicial inquiry on the ques-
tion prior to holding the preliminary examination. The North Da-
kota Supreme Court recognized this critical distinction."
Taking opinions of experts at face value as established fact runs
counter to the existing posture of the law.7 4 Courts have uniformly
recognized the prerogative of a trier of fact to mitigate the weight
of expert testimony, and to reject it entirely when the reasons sup-
porting it are unsound. 75 The Federal District court view would
overturn this settled concept of the role of experts in legal proceed-
ings.
VI. CONCLUSION
The North Dakota statute on competency to stand trial merely
codifies the common law rule. It prescribes a method for ascertain-
ing, where the issue is properly raised, whether a defendant is able
to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his de-
fense.
The Iverson case is the sole source of judicial interpretation of
the North Dakota statute; and that case is still not finally resolved.
70. Iverson v. State, 347 F. Supp. 251, 260 (D.N.D. 1972).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1, 35 (N.D. 1971). The Supreme Court stated that
the magistrate should have proceeded "to immediately fix a time for a hearing to deter-
mine Iverson's mental condition." Id.
74. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1920 (3rd ed. 1940).
75. "[E]xpert opinion rises no higher than the reasons upon which It is based, and
Is not binding upon the trier of the facts." Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385, 397
(8th Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
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Tentatively it has agitated as much perplexity as it has settled. The
assumption by both the state and federal court that a committing
magistrate has the right and duty to determine present sanity is
a singular one. It runs counter to the language of the applicable
statute and the trend of reported precedent.
Also disquieting is the standing given to the opinions of profes-
sional experts by the Federal District Court decision. Certainly in
the light of that decision, no North Dakota court would dare to sub-
stitute its own judgment for an uncontroverted contrary one an-
nounced by professional experts. In its ultimate effect this would
involve a transfer in many cases of judicial decision-naking power
to an extra-judicial source. This is not a prospect to be applauded.
The traditional role and responsibility of the court in competency
matters should not be thus diluted.
The psychiatrists may advise, the lawyers may urge
and argue, the defendant may disguise his feelings, act out
his emotions or stand mute, but it is the word of the judge
that must ultimately prevail in deciding whether the de-
fendant is fit to proceed in the matter before him.76
ADDENDUM
The interim since the foregoing subject matter was written, has
been marked by two very significant developments. The 1973 North
Dakota Legislative Assembly has enacted a new competency statute
designed to become operative in 1975; and the United States Court
of Appeals for the 8th Circuit has filed its decision in the Iverson
case.
A new criminal code of sweeping magnitude was adopted by
the 1973 Legislature.- It contains somewhat revised procedures for
testing a defendant's fitness to stand trial. It provides that after
July 1, 1975, when there is "reason to doubt . . . fitness to pro-
ceed," the court may order a defendant examined by a licensed
psychiatrist, or committed to the state hospital or other suitable
76. Cooper, Fitness to Proceed, 52 NEB. L. REv. 44, 67 (1972).
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facility for 30 days.78 If necessary, the commitment can be extend-
ed for an additional 30 days. A written psychiatrist's report is then
to be made to the court with copies going to counsel for the State
and the defendant. If either party takes issue with the report, a
hearing is to be held.79
Whenever the court finds that the accused is unfit to proceed,
he is to be committed to either the state hospital or the state
school. If the impairment continues for three years, (or for the
maximum time he could have been confined upon conviction, if less
than three years) the case against him will be dismissed. He is
then to be turned over to the mental health board for possible
further action.80
An innovative feature of the new law will allow defense counsel
to challenge the legality of a prosecution even though the accused
is mentally unfit. This right is limited, however, any such objection
to the prosecution must be of such character as to be "susceptible
of fair determination prior to trial and without the personal partici-
pation of the defendant." 8'
On June 11, 1973, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit decided the Iverson appeal. 2 It reversed the ruling
of the federal district court. Among principal issues discussed was
Iverson's contention that he was denied due process because of
mental incompetence at the time of the preliminary examination.
Upon review of the record of the preliminary examination the
court found that the evidence adduced at that time did not vary
materially from facts developed at either the inquest or the trial. 83
Since there was no claim that Iverson was incompetent at the trial,
the appeals court concluded that no prejudice could have stemmed
from his supposed incompetency during the preliminary examina-
tion. The court said:
It is difficult to know in what manner he might have
additionally aided his counsel at the preliminary hearing in
order to call additional witnesses, cross-examine witnesses
or discover exculpatory evidence.84
The circuit court concluded:
Under the circumstances we hold that Iverson's preliminary
77. Ch. 116, [1973] N.D. Laws 215.
78. Id. § 12.1-04-06 at 224-25.
79. Id. § 12.1-04-07 at 225.
80. Id. § 12.1-04-08 at 225.
81. Id. § 12.1-04-09 at 225.
82. Iverson v. State of North Dakota, (8th Cir., June 11, 1973) No. 72-1600
83. Id. at 10.
84. Id. at 10.
COMPETENCY FOR TRIAL
hearing conducted on January 21, with Iverson's counsel
present, did not violate his due process in the absence of
showing of specific prejudice. . ..
. . . We find no prejudice and no denial of Iverson's rights
by the conduct of the preliminary hearing.
85
85. Id. at 10.

